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The term "sanction," as used in the nominative case, is defined in
Black's Law Dictionary as "[t]hat part of a law which is designed to
secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation or offering
a reward for its observance."1
This short and pithy definition of sanction, like any other diction-
ary definition, is meant to incite the curious to study and delve fur-
ther into the subject to obtain some appreciation for the full
magnitude of the term as employed by the legal community. For a
clearer understanding of the term, one must access the realm of the
legal community with its attendant lore as derived from statutes, de-
cisions, rules of court, custom and usage.
This article examines selected authorities and seasons the discus-
sion with impressions gained through practical experience on the
trial and appellate benches. Its goal is to improve our corporate un-
derstanding of the commonly used device of sanctions. The time will
be well spent since requests for sanctions now seem to appear in al-
most every pleading and brief filed in our courts.2
* Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Divi-
sion 7; B.A., Rice University, 1958; J.D., Loyola University (Los Angeles), 1963. Admit-
ted to practice in California, 1964. The author was engaged in private practice from
1964 through 1984. He was appointed to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in
1984, where he served as a judge in the civil and criminal trial departments, the law
and motion department, and the appellate department of the superior court. He was
elevated in 1988 to the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 7, as an
associate justice. The author wishes to express his gratitude to J. Steven Bingman for
his valuable research and editorial assistance.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (5th ed. 1979).
2. The proliferation of requests for sanctions has been accompanied by the in-
creasing use of the appellate court system to contest the sanctions imposed at the trial
Also explored, and indeed promoted, are the permissible and logi-
cal inferences that can be drawn concerning the utility of California's
legal concept of sanctions in promoting or detracting from that great
crusade which now permeates our legal system from beginning to
end-"trial and appellate court delay reduction."3 .
In order to curtail any myopia that might exist, it is necessary to
point out that sanctions come in a variety of packages. Commonly,
and perhaps most often, when referring to sanctions, our minds im-
mediately focus on "monetary" sanctions, either as a penalty or as a
reward depending on whether one is on the giving or receiving end of
the sanction.4 However, the cautious will be well advised that the
use of sanctions by the courts is on the rise in a variety of forms.
court level. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 5, col. 1. Justice Lynn Compton has stated
that " 'what is happening is that the trial courts are using sanctions more, which in
turn has led to more appeals' .... Id. (quoting Justice Compton of the California
Second District Court of Appeal). It also has been noted that "[t]he relative frequency
of sanctions awards in recent years suggests not only that courts are more willing to
award them, but that respondents are more readily inclined to ask for them."
Meadow, Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1985, at 48, 52.
However, the motion for sanctions itself is often frivolous. Motions for sanctions
usually are incorporated into a case as a matter of course. Hinerfeld, The Sanctions
Explosion, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 33, 82. Arthur Miller, a Harvard Law School pro-
fessor, once illustrated the frivolous nature of sanctions in a "Kafkaesque dream," or
perhaps a nightmare, "in which motions for sanctions would be countered with mo-
tions to sanction frivolous motions for sanctions, which would be similarly countered
with more motions for sanctions, ad infinitum." Id.
3. See Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68609 (West Supp.
1990).
4. The term "penalty" may be a misnomer. In an interesting article on the pos-
sibilities of insuring for monetary sanctions, the authors assert that whether a sanction
is a penalty may be predicated on the intent of the sanctioned attorney. See Lynberg,
Larin, & Langbord, Monetary Sanctions Under California Law: Are They Insurable?,
L.A. LAW., Dec. 1988, at 26. If the court determines that an attorney intentionally ac-
ted in a sanctionable manner, the monetary sanctions imposed against the attorney
should be considered a penalty and thus uninsurable under an errors and omissions
policy. Id. at 28.
However, a different question arises when the sanctioned attorney was merely negli-
gent in evaluating a client's case or the merits of a particular motion. A monetary
sanction for negligently bringing a frivolous motion can be analogized to legal malprac-
tice. Id. Therefore, one could assert that this type of sanction should be covered under
a standard errors and omissions insurance policy. Id. "Thus, the damages caused by a
negligent attorney who is sanctioned should be insurable because an '. . . insurer in-
tend[s] to insure against liability for losses to others .... ' " Id. (citation omitted).
However, "[t]he losses caused by a negligent attorney who is sanctioned are the addi-
tional costs imposed on the opposing party as well as the courts and the judicial pro-
cess because of the negligent attorney's conduct." Id. One could argue, therefore, that
the purpose behind sanctions as a deterrent requires that sanctionable actions for fri-
volity in the judicial system be excluded from coverage regardless of the intent of the
attorney.
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II. COMMON SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND THE RANGE OF
JUDICIALLY IMPOSED SANCTIONS
The general authority for the imposition of sanctions are many, va-
ried, and sprinkled throughout California's Government Code, the
Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Code, and the Rules of the Court.
In section 68609(d) of the California Government Code, judges are
given authority to impose sanctions to achieve the purposes of the
Trial Court Delay Reduction Act.5 Section 128 of the Code of Civil
Procedure grants general powers to the court to control proceedings
before it.6 Furthermore, section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
gives trial courts and judicial arbitrators the authority to order a
party who engages in frivolous actions or delay tactics to pay the ex-
penses and attorneys' fees of the opposing party.7
5. Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68609(d) (West Supp.
1990). Section 68609(d) provides:
In order to enforce the requirements of an exemplary delay reduction pro-
gram and orders issued in cases assigned to it, the judges of the program shall
have all the powers to impose sanctions authorized by law, including the
power to dismiss actions or strike pleadings, if it appears that less severe sanc-
tions would not be effective after taking into account the effect of previous
sanctions or previous lack of compliance in the case. Judges are encouraged to
impose sanctions to achieve the purposes of this article.
Id. (emphasis added).
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128 (West Supp. 1990); see Fairfield v. Superior Court,
246 Cal. App. 2d 113, 120, 54 Cal. Rptr. 721, 725 (1966) (trial court in its discretion may
impose appropriate sanctions to a party who refuses to obey an order requiring further
responses to interrogatories).
7. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); see In re Marriage of
Quinlan, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1417, 257 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1989); see also Frank Annino & Sons
Constr., Inc. v. McArthur Restaurants, Inc., 215 Cal. App. 3d 353, 263 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1989); People v. Cook, 209 Cal. App. 3d 404, 257 Cal. Rptr. 226, modified, 209 Cal. App.
3d 1098c (1989); Bach v. McNelis, 207 Cal. App. 3d 852, 255 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1989).
The court in Quinlan reaffirmed that an attorney is entitled to prior notice of the
threat of the imposition of sanctions by the trial court, and the grounds thereunder,
before being sanctioned under section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Quinlan,
209 Cal. App. 3d at 1419, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 851. However, the court disposed of any ne-
cessity to hear the matter of sanctions on a "separate" day. Id. It further found that a
delay beyond the trial court's two-hour hearing limit, when used for improper pur-
poses, was a substantive basis for sanctions. Id. at 1422, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53.
Bach involved a suit against a justice of the peace and a superior court judge. Sanc-
tions against the plaintiff, an attorney, were imposed and upheld on appeal because
"some but not all causes of action" were frivolous under section 128.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Bach, 207 Cal. App. 3d at 875, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 245. The court incor-
porated a threshold test which provides that the line between acceptable and unaccept-
able conduct is crossed when, among other things, "'a significant and material part of
the appeal' " is frivolous. Id. at 875-76, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 246 (quoting Maple Properties
v. Harris, 158 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1010, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532, 541 (1984) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985)). The court also held that
Section 177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits the court to
impose monetary sanctions, payable to the county, for violations of
court orders.8 Section 437c(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows
the court to sanction parties for the filing of affidavits in bad faith
during a summary judgment motion.9 The court also may impose
penalties under section 575.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the
failure to comply with the requirements of local rules.10
One of the rules that allows the court the power to impose alterna-
sanctions on appeal are proper when the appeal is "totally and completely without
merit." Id. at 880, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 249; see also Silver v. Gold, 211 Cal. App. 3d 17, 25-
26, 259 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189-90 (1989) (frivolous motion to tax costs warranted imposition
of sanctions).
In Frank Annino, the appellate court upheld an award of monetary sanctions under
section 128.5 despite the fact that the plaintiff had dismissed the action against the
awardee, thereby removing the litigant from the "party" classification required by the
statute. Frank Annino, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 595. The court held
that "[a]llowing a person no longer a party to obtain sanctions for the bad faith tactics
(under which] he suffered while he was a party is clearly consistent with the purposes
of section 128.5." Id. at 358, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 596 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In Cook, the trial court imposed sanctions against the Orange County District Attor-
ney for prosecuting a weak cause of action for possession with intent to sell a con-
trolled substance. The court acquitted the defendant of the possession for sale charge,
see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West 1985), and referred the defendant to a drug diver-
sion program. Because the defendant had desired this from the beginning, the court
imposed sanctions under section 128.5 in the amount of $3000, which represented the
costs of holding the jury trial. Cook, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The
matter was reversed on appeal. After considering the legislative history and intent of
section 128.5, the court found that it applies only to civil cases. Id. at 407, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 227.
8. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 177.5 (West Supp. 1990); see Laborer's Int'l Union N.
Am. Local 89 v. El Dorado Landscape Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 993, 256 Cal. Rptr. 632
(1989); Moyal v. Lanphear, 208 Cal. App. 3d 491, 256 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1989). In Moyal, an
attorney failed to comply with the local "fast track" rules of the court. The court dis-
missed the case and imposed sanctions against the attorney. Id. at 494, 256 Cal. Rptr.
at 296-97. The sanctions against the attorney were upheld on appeal under section
177.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 501, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 301. However, the
dismissal was reversed. The court found that the client was blameless and, therefore,
the lower court had abused its discretion in dismissing the client's action. Id. at 503,
256 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03. The dismissal was not in the spirit of section 575.2(b) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that the negligence of the attorney is not to
be imputed to the client. Id. at 502-03, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 575.2(b) (West Supp. 1990)).
In Laborer's International, the court found that local "fast track" rules, imple-
mented to carry out the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, were constitutionally sound.
Laborer's Int'l, 208 Cal. App. 3d at 1002-05, 256 Cal. Rptr. 635-38. The court specifically
held that sanctions imposed under section 177.5 for an attorney's failure to file the re-
quired at-issue memorandum per local "fast track" rules did not violate the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at
1008-09, 256 Cal. Rptr. 639-40. The court's order to show cause (OSC) as to why sanc-
tions should not be imposed gave the attorney the required notice and opportunity to
be heard. Id. at 1008-09, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41.
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(i) (West Supp. 1990).
10. Id. § 575.2; see California ex rel Public Works Bd. v. Bragg, 183 Cal. App. 3d
1018, 1028-29, 228 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582-83 (1986) (noting that court must impose penalties
sua sponte upon counsel who fail to comply with local rules).
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tives to monetary penalties is section 583.150 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, which preserves dismissal and sanction power under court-
adopted rules and under the inherent power of the court."' In tan-
dem with section 583.150 is section 583.360 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, which mandates dismissal for a failure to bring an action to
trial within certain time periods.12 Section 583.430 of the Code of
Civil Procedure sets forth the conditions for granting or denying a
discretionary dismissal.13
Section 907 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows additional dam-
ages on appeal for costs resulting from frivolous or delaying tactics.14
Sections 2016 through 2036 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide
the basis for controlling the method and scope of discovery in Califor-
nia and also the permissible sanctions for failing to comply with the
discovery act without substantial justification.15
11. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 583.150 (West Supp. 1990).
12. Id. § 583.360; see Varwig v. Leider, 171 Cal. App. 3d 312, 316, 217 Cal. Rptr. 208,
211 (1985) (plaintiff's failure to enforce settlement or bring suit to trial within five
years of the filing, void of acceptable reasons, requires dismissal); see also Berry v.
Weitzman, 203 Cal. App. 3d 351, 357-58, 249 Cal. Rptr. 816, 820 (1988) (plaintiff's failure
to take purposeful action to bring suit to trial within final six months of a tolled stat-
ute of limitations with an overall time frame of five years requires dismissal).
13. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.430 (West Supp. 1990). This provision basically al-
lows the court to set conditions upon which the granting or denial of the dismissal will
be based. Id. The court also can require the parties to comply with those terms it
finds necessary. Id.
14. Id. § 907 (West 1980); see Young v. Rosenthal, 212 Cal. App. 3d 96, 130-35, 260
Cal. Rptr. 369, 390-94 (1989) (appeals sanctionable because they were prosecuted for no
other reason than to harass and delay); infra note 15; see also National Secretarial
Serv., Inc. v. Froelich, 210 Cal. App. 3d 510, 526, 258 Cal. Rptr. 506, modified, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 1145h (1989). In Froelich, the court held that the delay tactics incorporated by
the appellants were sanctionable in order to discourage similar future behavior. Id. at
526, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 515. The court imposed sanctions of $3500 to cover the appellee's
costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 526-27, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 516. The court contemplated
imposing sanctions to reimburse the state for the expense of the frivolous appeal. Be-
cause the appellants had not been given notice of the court's consideration of such ad-
ditional sanctions, the court declined to impose them. Id.; see infra note 51 and
accompanying text.
15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2036 (West Supp. 1990). Section 2023 is the pri-
mary section under which sanctions may be imposed. The most recent extensive case
involving sanctions under the discovery requirements is Young v. Rosenthal, 212 Cal.
App. 3d 96, 260 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1989). The decision pertains exclusively to issues con-
cerning sanctions imposed at both the trial and appellate levels. The suit involved a
disbarred attorney and his former counsel, who was seeking to collect attorneys' fees
for services rendered. Successive law firms were involved. The disbarred lawyer was
represented by counsel at trial and on appeal.
The case is also noteworthy because it involves an extensive review of the general
law of sanctions. For example, the appellate court held that the imposition of mone-
tary sanctions for abuse of the discovery process was justified. Id. at 118-19, 260 Cal.
Under section 4370.5 of the California Civil Code, just and reason-
able awards for costs and attorneys' fees in a pending dissolution pro-
ceeding may be based upon the conduct of the parties or the
attorneys involved.16
Rptr. at 382-83. The appellate court also held that the trial court's imposition of "facts
established" sanctions, as well as "evidentiary limitations," was within its discretion.
Id. at 114-18, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 379-382. Interestingly, the appellate court also upheld
the finding that the attorney and the client were jointly and severally liable for bring-
ing the frivolous motion as the record demonstrated that the defendant was very active
in the misconduct. Id. at 121, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court further held that a con-
tribution action by the current lawyer was permissible under sections 882 and 883 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (contribution among judgment debtors) against the dis-
barred lawyer-client for contribution of monetary sanctions, jointly and severally im-
posed. Id. at 128-29, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
The court also concluded, in reference to the resolution of the ethical dilemma of
current counsel in representing the disbarred lawyer under section 6068 of the Califor-
nia Business and Professions Code and rule 7-105 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the California State Bar, that no attorney has an ethical obligation to a client to per-
jure himself or to file a knowingly frivolous or bad faith motion. Id. at 126-28, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 387-89. The attorney must withdraw if the client persists. Id. at 128, 260 Cal.
Rptr. at 389.
The court stated that sanctions on appeal are available under either section 907 of
the Code of Civil Procedure or rule 26(a) of the California Rules of Court. Id. at 130,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 390. The court did not discuss whether evidence must be taken under
section 907 since the section refers to damages, thereby inferring that an evidentiary
hearing is necessary to fix the amount. The issue is left unresolved by the decision. Id.
at 130-34, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 390-94.
The decision is a good review of the subjective and the objective tests set forth in In
re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. App. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982).
See infra note 17. The court in Young held that payment of a judgment prior to taking
an appeal will not avoid sanctions. Young, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 260 Cal. Rptr. at
391. The delay ingredient still must be examined. Id.
Finally, the court emphasized that sanctions on appeal are to discourage such con-
duct and to compensate for delay. Id. at 134, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court used rea-
sonable attorneys' fees as a standard for fixing the amount of sanctions. Id. at 134-35,
260 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94.
Discovery sanctions also were discussed in Thoren v. Johnston and Washer, 29 Cal.
App. 3d 270, 105 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1972). "The power of the trial court to bar the testi-
mony of a witness . . . is found in the express language of the discovery act and is an
inherently necessary one if the purposes of the act are to be achieved." Id. at 273, 105
Cal. Rptr. at 278; see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 544, 565, 142
Cal. Rptr. 390, 397 (1977), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 436 U.S. 952, reh'g denied,
439 U.S. 881 (1978) (court has discretion to prevent documents which a party failed to
produce in discovery from being introduced at trial).
16. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4370.5 (West Supp. 1990). This issue was addressed in a suit
decided by Division 7 of the Second Appellate District. See In re Marriage of Norton,
206 Cal. App. 3d 53, 253 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1988). In a dissolution suit involving child cus-
tody, the wife, who at the appellate level was the petitioner, filed a petition to regain
custody due to changed circumstances. The trial court found the petition to be unrea-
sonable. Id. at 56, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 356. Based upon that fact, and the fact that the
wife had instigated numerous claims just to harass her estranged husband, the appel-
late court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions,
and it upheld the sanction award of $2500. Id. at 56-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57; see also
In re Marriage of Melone, 193 Cal. App. 3d 757, 765-66, 238 Cal. Rptr. 510, 515 (1987)
(award of wife's attorney's fees was proper when husband failed to sign a stipulation
offered by his wife postponing spousal support; failed to appear at the scheduled hear-
ing; and subsequently sought to have the resulting order for support set aside).
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Turning to the California Rules of Court, under rule 26 the court
may impose penalties for frivolous appeals or unreasonable infrac-
tions of the rules on appeal. 17 Finally, rule 227 of the California
Rules of Court addresses sanctions for failure to comply with the
rules, the local rules, and court orders.18
As is readily discernible from the most cursory reading of the
above statutory and rule references and annotations, the range of
sanctions clearly exceeds that of merely imposing monetary penal-
ties. The range of sanctions may include any of the following in de-
scending order of severity: dismissal (civil death penalty); entry of
default; striking of pleadings; evidence, witness, and issue limitation;
vacation of motion or trial date; and monetary sanctions. The uniniti-
ated should be cognizant of the variety of sanctions available under
existing California law.19
III. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS
Sanctions can be traced back almost indefinitely. In ancient times
17. CAL. SuP. CT. & CT. App. R. 26; see Otworth v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 166
Cal. App. 3d 452, 212 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1985). The determination of the frivolity of an
appeal in support of sanctions is a two-part test:
The subjective standard looks both to the motives and good faith of the appel-
lant, imposing a penalty where the only purpose of the appeal was to harass
the respondent or to delay the effect of an adverse judgment. The objective
standard looks at the merits of the appeal from a reasonable person's perspec-
tive, imposing sanctions where any reasonable person would agree that the
point is totally and completely devoid of merit.
Id. at 461, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 748 (citing Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 649, 646 P.2d at 186-87, 183
Cal. Rptr. at 515-16). But see Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 649-51, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 16-17 (in applying the subjective and objective standard, "punishment should
be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct"). See also infra note
53 and accompanying text.
In M.E. Gray Co. v. Gray, 163 Cal. App. 3d, 1025, 210 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1985), the court,
bearing in mind the limitation of sanctions to egregious conduct as stated in Flaherty,
chose only to employ the objective standard. Id. at 1039-40, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.
The Gray court, in a strongly worded opinion, held that a law firm's appeal from an
order imposing sanctions for the filing of a frivolous motion was in and of itself with-
out merit and, therefore, frivolous. Id. The "firm's decision to pursue an appeal not
only exacerbated an already appalling situation, but also, it exhibited a flagrant disre-
gard for the law firm's obligation 'to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members
of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice.'" Id. at 1040, 210 Cal. Rptr.
at 294 (quoting Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d at 647, 646 P.2d at 185, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 514 (cita-
tion omitted)).
18. CAL. SUP. CT. R. 227; see City of El Monte v. Takei, 158 Cal. App. 3d 244, 249-
50, 204 Cal. Rptr. 559, 562-63 (1984) (court "may order the person at fault 'to pay the
opposing party's reasonable expenses and counsel fees' " limited to actual costs).
19. "There is no doubt that courts have adopted a whole new attitude toward us-
ing sanctions to accomplish 'calendar management.'" Hinerfeld, supra note 2, at 33.
sanctions took the form of amercements. This was a penalty paid to
the crown upon a finding of misconduct in a criminal or civil proceed-
ing.20 "A plaintiff in any civil action would be amerced as a result of
nonsuit, bar, adverse verdict, or abatement of the action due to some
irregularity of pleading or procedure."21 The same was true for the
defendant should he lose the suit.22 As in the present, these sanc-
tions were appealable only on the issue of the amount, not on the
sanction itself.23
By the thirteenth century, statutes actually were enacted allowing
the award of damages to be in the form of land.24 During the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, amercement met its demise, and the
awarding of costs to the prevailing party began to appear in English
common law.25 By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, English
courts allowed case delay, so long as the attorney paid for the costs. 26
Later, the courts actually began to hold clients responsible for their
attorneys' conduct. Although early American courts imposed sanc-
tions, they did not address whether the client was responsible for the
sanction. 27
Most of California's sanctions statutes are fairly young. However,
"California appellate courts have been statutorily authorized to im-
pose sanctions for the prosecution of frivolous civil appeals" since
1851.28 The statute's current version is section 907 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure. 29
Interpretation of the statutes via case law has been the focus of
much attention. In Bauguess v. Paine,30 the California Supreme
Court became concerned with the trial court's power to impose sanc-
tions. The court noted that the case "illustrates the dangers which
the exercise of such power, 'without appropriate safeguards and
guidelines' would pose."31 Thus, in 1981, the California legislature
enacted section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
20. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons
from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1259 (1987).
21. Id. (footnote omitted).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1259-60.
24. Id. at 1260-61.
25. Id. at 1264.
26. Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Improper
Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their Attorneys' Procedural Errors,
1988 DUKE L.J. 733, 735.
27. Id. at 735-36.
28. Eisenberg, Sanctions on Appeal: A Survey and a Proposal for Computation
Guidelines, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 13, 14 (1985).
29. Id.; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 907 (West 1980).
30. 22 Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978), withdrawn, 204 Cal. App.
3d 349, 251 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1988).
31. Id. at 639, 586 P.2d at 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
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Almost immediately, courts began to apply section 128.5 to issues
pertaining to a requirement of good faith in the filing of motions, as
well as to motions involving harassment or delay.32 As use of section
128.5 developed, due process concerns emerged, and the courts began
to require that attorney's receive adequate notice before sanctions
could be imposed. 33
Notwithstanding the growing pains California has experienced
with the increasing use of sanctions, the courts in recent years have
imposed and upheld sizeable sanctions. In an extreme case, Hersch v.
Citizens Savings & Loan Association,34 the Second Appellate District
not only upheld a ruling for the plaintiffs, but also imposed a sanc-
tion of $125,000 after determining that the appeal was taken for the
purpose of delay. That same year, the Second Appellate District im-
posed a $10,000 sanction in Comora v. Comprehensive Care Corp.35
This imposition came after the court of appeal took notice of sanc-
tions totaling over $14,000, the result of some fourteen years of litiga-
tion.36 In 1984, the court of appeal in Maple Properties v. Harris37
imposed a $20,000 sanction upon an appellant for using the judicial
system to reargue a resolved matter. More recently, in Dwyer v.,
Crocker National Bank,38 the court of appeal held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions prohibiting the in-
troduction of certain evidence at trial or by motion, or in awarding
$75,258 to cover the defendant's attorney's fees and expenses. Addi-
tionally, the court also found that under rule 26 of the California
Rules of Court, the appeal itself was frivolous and thus imposed an
32. See Karwasky v. Zachay, 146 Cal. App. 3d 679, 194 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1983).
"'[T]he concept of good faith has to include the concept that motions are brought,
based upon at least some statutory law, or based upon case law, or at least is based
upon some kind of a concept that has a logic or coherency to it ....'" Id. at 681, 194
Cal. Rptr. at 294 (quoting the trial court); see also Ellis v. Roshei Corp., 143 Cal. App.
3d 642, 649-50, 192 Cal. Rptr. 57, 61-62 (1983) (delay tactics seen as an unnecessary ex-
penditure of time and thereby sanctionable).
33. See O'Brien v. Cseh, 148 Cal. App. 3d 957, 961, 196 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411 (1983) (ex
parte notification of the opposing counsel against whom sanctions are sought does not
constitute adequate notice); see also Corralejo v. Quiroga, 152 Cal. App. 3d 871, 872-74,
199 Cal. Rptr. 733, 734-35 (1984) (reversing sanctions because defendant's counsel did
not have adequate notice "of the need to prove his or her own blamelessness in the
complained of actions").
34. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1012, 194 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (1983)..
35. 140 Cal. App. 3d 369, 378, 189 Cal. Rptr. 538, 543 (1983).
36. Id. at 377-78, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
37. 158 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1101, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532, 542 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1054 (1985).
38. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1418, 1431-37, 240 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-07 (1987).
additional $10,000 sanction upon appellants.39
What this should tell attorneys is that the imposition of sanctions is
definitely on the rise. More importantly, the courts are not reluctant
to award appropriate sanctions, even if they appear extreme.40 Some
attorneys complain that the increase in the number of sanctions im-
posed, as well as the amounts, has not provided a stable basis upon
which history or precedent can be built; and, therefore, those practic-
ing law have no appreciable level of expectation. 41 However, well fo-
cused lawyers who concentrate their energies on acting responsibly
as officers of the court have no reason to fear the sanctioning power
of any court. It is only those attorneys who constantly walk on the
edge of impropriety, waiting for the courts to punish them, who must
be concerned with the question of expectation, and rightly so.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NECESSITY FOR SANCTIONS
Every judge who has presided in any department of a busy trial
court, particularly in a civil law and motion department, is immedi-
ately faced with motions of merit, marginally meritorious motions,
and motions'which are clearly devoid of any merit. Fortunately, the
latter type of motion is in the minority, but the minority is indeed
becoming well represented. When faced with a motion that is devoid
of any legal merit, the general judicial "staff" conversation invariably
centers around the reason for bringing such a motion. The staff at-
torneys assigned to the judge or other hearing officers frequently will
comment at the completion of their analysis: "Must be the end of the
month and billable hours have to be generated to pay the overhead,"
or, "just another paper war," or, "the paralegal was unsupervised
again." 42 The analysis and recommendation by the judicial staff to
the judge may be persuasive and even reflected in the judge's pre-
39. Id. at 1440, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 309; see supra note 17 concerning rule 26.
40. "[I]t cannot help but improve cooperation between attorneys and reduce use-
less acts that interfere with the orderly and efficient administration of justice. For all
those who spend their daily lives in the litigation process, the trend is a welcome one."
Ross, Attorney Fees as Sanctions, L.A. LAW., June 1986, at 34, 40.
41. Hinerfeld, supra note 2, at 34.
42. Regarding nonmeritorious appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has noted that " '[ciounsel must realize that the decision to appeal should be a
considered one . . . not a knee-jerk reaction to every unfavorable ruling.'" Meadow,
supra note 2, at 52 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513
F.2d 832, 834 (2d Cir. 1975)). The First District of the California Court of Appeal has
noted that:
An attorney in a civil case is not a hired gun required to carry out every direc-
tion given by the client. As a professional, counsel has a professional responsi-
bility not to pursue an appeal that is frivolous or taken for the purpose of
delay, just because the client instructs him or her to do so. Under such cir-
cumstances, the high ethical and professional standards of a member of the
bar and an officer of the court require the attorney to inform the client that
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hearing tentative ruling or opinion, written or unwritten. A prudent
lawyer should never underestimate the weight that judicial staff
analysis and recommendations may carry with a judge in a busy court
environment.
4 3
After being confronted with nonmeritorious contentions, is such a
suspecting judicial frame of mind reasonable, or is it the result of an
unwarranted quantum leap in logic by one who has possibly forgot-
ten that he or she was once also engaged in the practice of law? It is
submitted that the growing evidence in the legal community supports
the former conclusion. Three factors lend credence to this conclu-
sion: (1) the increasing abundance of attorney services, (2) the estab-
lishment of "mega-law firms" and "mega-salaries," and (3) the drift
toward establishing mercantilism in the practice of law.
Initially, it is interesting to note the statistics concerning the avail-
ability of lawyers in California and their resultant impact on the
courts. One is constantly bombarded with bar admission statistics.
As of the date of the last administration of oaths to practice law,
there were 122,300 lawyers admitted to practice law in California.44
According to statistics compiled by the American Bar Foundation in
Chicago, California could boast one lawyer for every 247 persons in
1989, a substantial increase over the one lawyer for every 367 persons
in 1980. These statistics readily demonstrate the rapid increase in the
availability of attorney services in California. Does this fact alone
the attorney's professional responsibility precludes him or her from pursuing
such an appeal, and to withdraw from the representation of the client.
Cosenza v. Kramer, 152 Cal. App. 3d 1100, 1103, 200 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1984) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
An attorney should remember that "[a] lawyer who has been sanctioned may face a
long and expensive fight to save his name and career .... Hinerfeld, supra note 2, at
82.
43. Courts have long been empowered to impose sanctions in order to control
their dockets. Attorneys should be aware that the judicial staff may become frustrated
with analyzing frivolous motions. "If, over the life of a lawsuit, the lawyer and his cli-
ent have built up a pattern of poor conduct, they should not be surprised if an appel-
late court finds that the appeal itself is merely one more step in the process" and
thereby sanctionable. Meadow, supra note 2, at 52. "In evaluating the appellant's mo-
tives, the courts have consistently gone beyond the confines of the appeal itself." Id. at
50; see Comora v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 140 Cal. App. 3d 369, 377, 189 Cal. Rptr.
538, 542 (1983) ($10,000 sanction upheld for harassment through groundless litigation
over 14 years); see also Beckstead v. International Indus., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 3d 927,
935, 179 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771 (1982) ($6000 sanction imposed based upon appellants' long
history of unmeritorious and frivolous appeals).
44. In July 1989, 59.1% of those who took the California bar examination, consid-
ered one the most rigorous in the nation, passed, bringing the number of California
attorneys to the listed number. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 28, 1989, at A7 (final ed.).
support the conclusion that when frivolous positions are taken in
court documents and briefs, the blame must be placed on the in-
creased abundance of attorney services in California? The question is
rhetorical and needs only a short and quick response: "No!" Nor
does the availability of attorneys support an inference that there are
too many lawyers in California. History is replete with many in-
stances of honorable services performed by the California bar and the
contribution that attorneys have made to the improvement of the
body politic. No small credit should be given to our California law-
yers for their contribution to the prosperity of our state. However, it
is an indisputable fact that with the increase in bar population must
come an increase in the opportunity for urging untenable legal posi-
tions in court.45
A second factor which appears to give rise to frivolous pleadings
and the, concomitant necessity for sanctions is the drift toward the es-
tablishment of the "mega-law firm" and the payment of "mega-sala-
ries" to beginning lawyers.46 The current tendency toward an
inordinate conglomeration of attorneys into the mega-law firm is
without question. State bar journals, legal newspapers, and other pe-
riodicals constantly bombard us with information concerning the
"top" law firms in California in terms of population and salaries.
What once would have been labeled "a managing partner's
nightmare" only a few years ago has suddenly taken on the aura of
the ordinary. It is not uncommon to see a study comparison which
reveals that the top law firms in California, in some instances, have
affiliated attorneys exceeding one hundred in number. Added to this
is an oft-quoted statistic that often "jars" experienced bench officers
to the quick, since historically the majority have abandoned lucrative
positions in the private sector to accept service on the bench with less
remuneration. Of course, that statistic pertains to the salaries paid to
many beginning lawyers in the top firms. A figure approaching
$75,000 per year is not uncommon. 47 Where do the funds come from
45. Some individuals believe that the increase in the number of attorneys is the
cause of the increasing use of sanctions. Associate Justice Jack Goertzen of the Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, formerly the presiding judge 'of
the Los Angeles County Superior Court, believes that "there are simply more lawyers
litigating more cases." L.A. Daily J., Sept. 9, 1987, at 5, col. 1. However, others share
the belief that the problem lies within the legal profession itself and that more attor-
neys are doing anything and everything in order to win their cases. Id. No actual sta-
tistics are available, but judges and lawyers agree that the use of section 128.5 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, which addresses frivolous actions or delaying tac-
tics, has increased significantly. See Hinerfeld, supra note 2, at 35. For a discussion of
section 128.5, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
46. A 1989 survey by the National Law Journal shows that firm sizes, as well as
starting salaries, continue to rise steadily. Nat'l L.J., Dec. 25, 1989, at S1.
47. An alarming article in the Los Angeles Times reported that some of Los Ange-
les' largest firms purportedly were paying as much as $1100 a week for first- and sec-
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to pay such salaries in these well-populated law firms that are con-
stantly developing and appearing? The answer, of course, predomi-
nantly lies in the fees paid by clients, necessarily generated to pay
these sums which were unheard of a few short years ago. The essen-
tial ingredient to the concoction necessary to meet the monthly over-
head is, for the most part, "billable hours." The quandary then
becomes whether a decision to file a marginal pleading is dictated
more out of the necessity for billable hours than the client's best in-
terest. The more marginal the motion, the stronger the inference to
be drawn by judicial staff and bench officers that the client's inter-
ests have become ancillary.
A third factor affecting the conduct of litigation is an encroaching
and illegitimate legal philosophy concerning the status of the activity
we legal insiders commonly refer to as "practicing law." There was a
time when the prevailing language in the community at large, and
most certainly within the legal community when contemplating the
role of lawyers, was that of "professionalism." In earlier times, any
reference to an attorney being involved in a "job" or "vocation" was
met with a quick retort: "Professional." Now we see an acceptance
of a term in the legal profession which once was relegated to the
business community. The "law merchant" 48 seems to have gotten
within the city walls. Periodicals now refer to "the merchanting" of
legal services. It has even been suggested that we are only a prospec-
tus away from selling shares to investors as a means of financing law-
suits. 49 Such terms, which originate within the "law merchant,"
ond-year law students as summer clerks. L.A. Times, June 11, 1988, at B1, col. 1. As
this article appeared in 1988, it may be assumed that the market rate has increased.
"Law interns are richly rewarded not for the actual work they do over the summer
but because they are among the nation's most sought-after young legal minds. Their
employers want them to come back for full-time jobs on graduation." Id. The problem
of increasing overhead for these large firms is perpetuated by this recruiting process.
Once these interns have a taste of large salaries for summer positions, they expect
even greater remuneration for the full-time positions.
48. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (4th ed. 1951). Mercantile law connotes:
An expression substantially equivalent to the law-merchant or commercial
law. It designates the system of rules, customs, and usages generally recog-
nized and adopted by merchants and traders, and which, either in its simplic-
ity or as modified by common law or statutes, constitutes the law for the
regulation of their transactions and the solution of their controversies.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. See Cooper, Champerty, Anyone?, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1990, at 19. This could be
viewed as a creative way to finance a lawsuit. However, it smacks of "champerty, the
ancient and forbidden practice by which a person not a party to a suit pays for the liti-
gation and shares in the proceeds." Id.
degrade and cheapen our proud heritage as professionals. Indeed,
they create confusion within the legal community concerning the
role and duties of lawyers as officers of the court and representatives
of their clients.50 Could it be that the merchanting of legal services
in courts has led to the marginal or nonmeritorious motion, action, or
appeal? While some may disagree, the answer is plausibly in the
affirmative.
V. SANCTIONS AND COURT DELAY REDUCTIONS
California courts at all levels and in all departments are under ap-
plied stress to reduce calendar backlogs. Patience with marginal
pleadings, and most certainly with nonmeritorious pleadings, is at its
nadir. Of necessity, the courts are more inclined to impose sanctions
in order to preserve valuable time to resolve meritorious and deserv-
ing controversies. 51 Although the Court of Appeal for the Second
Appellate District articulated the proposition more poignantly,52 the
50. See supra note 7; see also Consenza v. Kramer, 152 Cal. App. 3d 1100, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 18 (1984). "[T]he attorney's professional responsibility precludes him or her from
pursuing... [frivolous] appeal(s], and... [requires] withdraw[al] from the representa-
tion of the client." Id. at 1103, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (emphasis added).
51. See Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 765 P.2d 498, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 336 (1989). Former California Supreme Court Associate Justice John Arguelles,
writing for a unanimous court, suggested that an alternative way to curb excessive liti-
gation is through the application of measures authorizing sanctions for frivolous or de-
laying conduct. He specifically wrote:
After reviewing the competing policy considerations, we agree with those de-
cisions and commentaries which have concluded that the most promising rem-
edy for excessive litigation does not lie in an expansion of malicious
prosecution liability. As the Supreme Court of Michigan has recently noted,
"In seeking a remedy for the excessive litigiousness of our society, we would
do well to cast off the limitations of a perspective which ascribes curative
power only to lawsuits." While the filing of frivolous lawsuits is certainly im-
proper and cannot in any way be condoned, in our view the better means of
addressing the problem of unjustified litigation is through the adoption of
measures facilitating the speedy resolution of the initial lawsuit and authoriz-
ing the imposition of sanctions for frivolous or delaying conduct within the
first action itself, rather than through an expansion of the opportunities for
initiating one or more additional rounds of malicious prosecution litigation af-
ter the first action has been concluded. In recent years, the Legislature has
taken several steps in this direction, enacting legislation to facilitate the early
weeding out of patently meritless claims and to permit the imposition of sanc-
tions in the initial lawsuit-against both litigants and attorneys-for frivolous
or delaying conduct. Because these avenues appear to provide the most prom-
ising remedies for the general problem of frivolous litigation, we do not be-
lieve it advisable to abandon or relax the traditional limitations on malicious
prosecution recovery.
Id. at 873-74, 765 P.2d at 503, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (citations omitted) (quoting Fried-
man v. Dorzorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585, 600 (1981)).
52. See National Secretarial Serv., Inc. v. Froelich, 210 Cal. App. 3d 510, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 506, modified, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1145h (1989). The Froelich court observed:
It is perhaps time that the courts, both trial and appellate, begin to speak and
react more forcefully with respect to cases such as this one. Such an abuse of
the legal system for no other purpose than to avoid paying a legitimate claim
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"chilling effect" admonition as to litigants' rights given by a unani-
mous California Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage of Fla-
herty53 is a phrase that is given great deference by bench officers.
The concern is that "[tihe lawyer who hears the footsteps of sanc-
tions may be less willing to pursue an aggressive course or to advance
a novel legal theory."54 However, the chilling effect of court conges-
tion is also paramount in the mind of our judicial officers.5 5 Witness
the mutative trend toward "rent-a-judging" occasioned by trial court
congestion and the rapidly developing dichotomy between monied lit-
simply can no longer be tolerated. It is not fair to the opposing litigant who is
victimized by such tactics and it is not fair to the greatly overworked judicial
system itself or those citizens with legitimate disputes waiting patiently to use
it. In those cases where such abuse is present, an award of substantial sanc-
tions is proper.
Id. at 526, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (footnote omitted); see supra note 14.
53. 31 Cal. 3d 637, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1982). The court specifically
noted:
Both strands of this definition are relevant to the determination that an ap-
peal is frivolous. An appeal taken for an improper motive represents a time-
consuming and disruptive use of the judicial process. Similarly, an appeal
taken despite the fact that no reasonable attorney could have thought it meri-
torious ties up judicial resources and diverts attention from the already bur-
densome volume of work at the appellate courts. Thus, an appeal should be
held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to
harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment-or when it
indisputably has no merit-when any reasonable attorney would agree that
the appeal is totally and completely without merit.
However, any definition must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect
on the assertion of litigants' rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a
right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely un-
likely that they will win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is
not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions. Counsel should not
be deterred from filing such appeals out of a fear of reprisals. Justice Kaus
stated it well. In reviewing the dangers inherent in any attempt to define
frivolous appeals, he said the courts cannot be "blind to the obvious: the bor-
derline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is
vague indeed .... The difficulty of drawing the line simply points up an es-
sential corollary to the power to dismiss frivolous appeals: that in all but the
clearest cases it should not be used."
Id. at 650, 646 P.2d at 187-88, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting People v. Sumner, 262 Cal. App. 2d 409, 415, 69 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19-20
(1968)); see supra note 17; see also Weston, The Threat of Sanctions for Frivolous Suits,
COMPLEAT LAW., Winter 1989, at 44. "The sanctions rule becomes a restraint prevent-
ing the lawyer from bringing a case for fear of the economic consequences rather than
the more legitimate and significant concern for vindicating his client's position and
broadening the law." Id.
54. Hinerfeld, supra note 2, at 33.
55. Judge Eli Chernow of the Los Angeles Superior Court
says [that] courts have long been mindful of warnings about the undesirable
consequences of sanctioning attorneys, but he welcomes the judicial control of
the courtroom that the threat of sanctions brings. "We as a society were so
concerned about 'chilling effects,'" says Chernow, "that we gave insufficient
igants and those less fortunately situated.56 Witness the loss of tal-
ented bench officers to the various "rent-a-judge" systems, and the
concomitant decrease in public confidence in our judicial systems as
administered. The applied concept of sanctions definitely has a legiti-
mate part to play in relieving our apprehensions over court conges-
tion. However, "[l]awyers by [virtue of their legal professionalism]
also have a responsibility to avoid . . . [frivolous actions] by bringing
objectivity and common sense to bear on their recommendations to
clients."57
However, this judicial tool of sanctions as an aid in reducing court
congestion does come with a price, which must be paid in terms of
additional judicial time requirements.58 Sanctions, whether cast as a
monetary fine or other punitive form, must be imposed with a great
deal of care since they are penal in nature.59 Because of the penalty
aspect of a sanction order, an additional care requirement is thrust
upon the bench officer to expend additional judicial time to insure
that the sanctions imposed are infused with due process, as a matter
of right in the first instance, and to avoid vulnerability on appellate
review in the second. A tendency exists on the part of many judges
to adopt, as a path of least resistance, the chilling effect admonition
of In re Marriage of Flaherty when considering sanctions, thereby
avoiding the additional time required to fine tune a sanction hearing
and subsequent order so that they will pass appellate muster. Such
an approach is self-defeating and of no benefit to court delay reduc-
tion. Meritorious motions for sanctions should be granted despite the
additional time constraints placed upon the busy bench officer. The
concomitant results will be salutary and visible in the form of de-
creased court congestion.
weight to the desirability of halting conduct that tended to be very destruc-
tive."
There is agreement on this point from the federal bench. "Some people say
it's chilled advocacy," says Judge Schwarzer. "I don't see any evidence of that
whatsoever. Anyone who wants to conduct himself as an effective advocate
and to bring forth a novel argument is not precluded from doing so."
Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (quoting Judge Eli Chernow of the Los Angeles Superior
Court and Judge William Schwarzer of the Northern District of California,
respectively).
56. See Neubauer, How Much Justice Can You Afford?, CAL. LITIG., Winter 1990
(editorial). Mark A. Neubauer is the chairperson of the Litigation Section.
57. Cosenza v. Kramer, 152 Cal. App. 3d 1100, 1103, 200 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1984); see
supra note 35.
58. See supra note 2 (increased use of sanctions has created an increase in appel-
late court review of sanctions).
59. But see supra note 4 (insurability of sanctions may depend upon the label
ascribed to them).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen whether the process of imposing sanctions
will effectively reduce trial and appellate court backlogs, or whether
the mechanics for imposing sanctions will elongate proceedings,
thereby increasing the number of cases on our trial and appellate
court calendars. However, if sanctions are consistently and properly
imposed, in keeping with constitutional requirements of due process,
the inevitable result will be a marked improvement in our backlog-
ged calendars, thus enabling better access to our courts by deserving
litigants.

